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Introduction: The Trajectory of
German Philosophy after Kant, and
the ‘Difference’ between Fichte and
Schelling
Michael G. Vater
Department of Philosophy, Marquette University
Milwaukee, WI

“The most obvious symptoms of an epoch-making system are the
misunderstandings and the awkward conduct of its adversaries.”
G. W. F. Hegel, The Difference between Fichte’s and Schelling’s
System of Philosophy1
While Hegel doubtless had Reinhold’s new interest in
philosophical realism or perhaps Schleiermacher’s psychological
interpretation of religious truth in mind as the ‘awkward symptoms of
the age’ and its dichotomizing reception of Kant’s legacy when he
penned these words, they can stand as the epitome of the relations
between Fichte and Schelling in the years leading up to Hegel’s first
published essay. After 1800, Fichte and Schelling each viewed the
letters and publications of his ‘collaborator’ with suspicion. Periods of
trust and encouragement alternated with spasms of mistrust and
outbreaks of accusations of personal betrayal and intellectual shortsightedness. Only one who with Hegel fervently believed in the ‘power
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of the negative’ could be edified at the sight of titanic strife between
powerful intellects who so deftly perceived the divisive issues of the
times and addressed their solution with such insight and breadth of
knowledge, but who persistently failed to identify the common position
they were publicly seen to represent and complained instead of a
single, massive ‘difference’ that separated them. Neither Hegel’s essay
nor any single utterance by Fichte or Schelling exactly pins down the
difference between them or underscores the underlying common
position that it presumes. That work is left to the reader and her
detective instincts. The editors and translators wish to let the texts
speak for themselves, and by ‘texts’ they mean both the letters
exchanged between the principals 1800-1802 and the published works
from those years which they exchanged in hopes of resolving the
‘difference’. We think the letters and published works have roughly
equal standing, for when the former turn to philosophical topics they
generally focus on very broad issues of philosophical presuppositions,
certainty, and methodology left over after their various and intricately
argued versions of ‘the system’ had been sent to their respective
publishers. The letters are placed first to provide an introduction to the
texts that follow, not because they have explanatory priority or
because the cultural and biographical situations they reference
illuminate the ‘difference’ better than the published works. Similarly,
the comments we offer in the pages that follow are offered to point out
a possible reading of the legacy of German philosophy after Kant, but
they will not open up a royal road through the by-ways of the history
of philosophy nor will they suggest that what the principals and their
contemporaries saw as the one difference was the one that will
necessarily stand today as the central philosophical issue. In
particular, we are agnostic on Hegelian presuppositions that outcomes
are better than prior conditions or that one can make an easy
separation between reflection – or the work of intellect – and reason or
intellectual intuition. No philosophical distinction can be univocally
deployed, and if quantum indeterminacies arise in physics, one can
hardly expect unambiguous meanings in social discourse, much less
philosophy.
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The Legacy of Kant
“. . . [T]he metaphysics of nature as well as morals, but above all the
preparatory (propaedeutic) critique of reason that dares to fly with its
own wings, alone constitutes that which we call philosophy in a
genuine sense. This relates everything to wisdom, but through the
path of science, the only one which, once cleared, is never overgrown
and leads to error.”
--Immanuel Kant, Architectonic of Pure, Critique of Pure Reason
A850/B8782
By the early 1790’s the bulk of Kant’s great systematic writings
had appeared, including the three Critiques and the Metaphysical
Foundations of Natural Science, but it was not widely recognized that
the critical philosophy formed a comprehensive system instead of
multiple preliminary sketches for a future system. Kant had given the
Critique of Pure Reason a partial re-write which distanced his position
from idealism, furthered its claims to have definitively reconciled
rationalism and empiricism, and announced that theoretical philosophy
had been given a ‘scientific’ foundation by a Copernican reversal of
perspective.3 The enduring achievement of the First Critique was to
insist that philosophy must settle questions of foundations and
methodology before and while it embarked on comprehensive
explanation—that ‘quid facti?’ could not be settled without ‘quid juris?’4
If Kant thought his contribution had ended metaphysics or the attempt
to think the supersensible, he did not foresee how the subjective or
Copernican turn coupled with methodological introspection could
produce the encyclopedic adventures in world-description that would
flow from the pens of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel in the coming
decades. The Critique of Practical Reason sliced through the theoretical
knot of freedom and determinism, declared the primacy of practical
reason in the phenomenon of conscience, and put the would-be
objects of metaphysical speculation within the reach of hope or
‘rational religion’. The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science
provided a theoretical framework for empirical physics, postulating
matter as filling space, compounded of opposite forces, supporting
phenomenal properties such as mass and density. Both of these works
could be viewed as tidy solutions to pesky but rather regional
problems, as could the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment’s limited
justification for cognitive overreach by the artist and the empirical
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scientist of theoretical bent. Yet something of the sweep of Kant’s
analysis and the grandeur of his philosophical nomenclature—are not
the famous ‘transcendental deductions’ the consummate Rube
Goldberg inventions?—seemed to inflate his philosophical results
beyond his personal intentions, and the wind which soon filled the sails
of the good ship Transcendental Idealism carried it swiftly out of safe
empirical harbor into uncharted oceans of ‘Speculation’.5 And despite
the popular message conveyed by the Prolegomena to Any Future
Metaphysics that the transcendental critique had slain the dragon of
dogmatism, Kant’s own tidiness in crafting distinctions may have
paved the way for the resurrection of robustly nonempirical philosophy
in the succeeding decades, for he closes the First Critique by insisting
upon the distinction between a ‘propaedeutical’ or preparatory function
of critique and the full systematic investigation of the reach of reason
in nature and morals that could legitimately be called metaphysics.6 A
plausible, though none too tidy, reading of the state of ‘Transcendental
Philosophy’ at the beginning of the Nineteenth Century could view Kant
as having definitely established the propaedeutic to an experiential
metaphysics, while Fichte and Schelling were hard at work attempting
to expand and consolidate the foundations of the metaphysics of
morals and metaphysics of nature that Kant had left behind. In this
broad sense, Schelling and Fichte believed they were collaborators on
a shared ‘scientific’ enterprise; even when they had misgivings about
each other, they were still eager to have the public perceive them as
united under the banner of Transcendental Philosophy-- as if it were
genuinely the ‘perennial philosophy’ engendered by modernity, and
not just an isolated contribution.
Whatever Kant himself said about the future of philosophy, his
texts seem to point to quite different, though equally fertile, territories
of development once philosophy had torn itself away from the delusory
project of trying to make definite theoretical pronouncements about
the supposedly ultimate anthropological, psychological and moral
frameworks of human life.7 Reinhold laid hold of the territory of
epistemology (and later on, logic) in his attempt to create a positive
‘Kantian’ system that was in some sense empirically based or
‘objective. After a brief initial flirtation with Reinhold’s foundationalism,
Fichte staked out the moral domain as his field of endeavor and sought
to enlarge the phenomenon of ‘conscience’—on the model of Kant’s
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categorical imperative—into a model of world-embodied consciousness
as such, closer to what we would today call ‘phenomenology’ than
other forms of contemporary philosophy. Schelling, schooled in Plato’s
Timaeus as well as Kantian critique, sought to expand Kant’s
fragmentary account of matter as impenetrability-in-space to a holistic
account of the physical sciences, one based more on the emerging
chemistry and biology of the new century than on Kant’s Newtonian
materialism. And Hegel would take up Kant’s systematic ‘leftovers’–
religion, social philosophy, economics, politics and history—and fashion
them into an account of human reality so bold and sweeping that it
dropped the labels ‘transcendental’ or ‘critical’ and proclaimed itself
absolute or objective idealism. But this suggestion considerably
oversimplifies the matter, for Kant’s heirs did not parcel up the
master’s domain and each set to work upon his own claimed turf; each
contended he was the sole inheritor of the whole estate and laid claim
to transcendental philosophy from his own point of the compass. Our
‘history of philosophy’--an art invented by Reinhold, Schelling, and
Hegel-- tries to make sense of the tussle in a linear fashion, but
neither chronological order nor the metaphor of spaces divided into
different regions or by different directions quite succeeds in making
clear sense of German philosophy from 1790 through 1820.8
Furthermore, though we must be content today to view philosophy as
an autonomous though peripheral stage of human endeavor, the
German-speaking lands of the early Nineteenth Century were guided
by ‘public intellectuals’ who were comfortable moving in multiple
disciplines that we think widely disparate—religion and politics,
philosophy and art, creative art and literary criticism, and even poetry
and empirical science.

The End of Modernity: ‘Open Sky’ or System?
“. . . [Even] after the labors of Kant and Reinhold, philosophy is still
not a science. [Schulze’s] Aenesidemus has shaken my own system to
its very foundations, and since one cannot very well live under the
open sky, I was forced to construct a new system.”
J. G. Fichte, draft of a letter to J. F. Flatt, late 17939
In many ways the end of the Eighteenth Century in Europe was
as disquieting and unnerving as it was filled with promise. Neither
Kant’s high-flown transcendental arguments for a legislative role for
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intellect in human cognition nor Reinhold’s ordinary-language attempt
to make the same point through an analysis of representation which
hovered somewhere between psychology and epistemology could
counter the power of willful doubt. The old order was crumbing, the
authority of established powers, political and ecclesiastical, was
undercut, and a new spirit of experimentalism-- neither as open or
candid as Goethe’s Werther nor as certain and self-assertive as the
never-aging Faust of that drama’s second part-- took over the literary
and scientific worlds. The world of knowledge was expanding, though
not yet beyond the capacities of singular intellects of encyclopedic
reach and genuine diversity; musicians became astronomers, poets
became ministers of state, and newly minted scientific disciplines were
captained by entrepreneurs working in carriage-houses rather than
universities. Though the cultivated celebrated the cult of ‘genius’, the
mob was at work in the street below---or the country just over the
border—and the world of learning was just waking to the subterranean
movements of social groups, of economic activity and international
trade, and of political organization and conflict. Fichte’s words echo the
resolve of one who has no choice but to rebuild in just the place the
earthquake has brought down the house. System, though perhaps
claustrophobic or leaky (as Kierkegaard and Heidegger reminded us10)
is at least shelter against the open sky of uncertainty and lack of
direction. Whether one can find eternal foundations is a chancy
prospect once one has been forced to give in to Galileo and admit that
the earth moves.
The inflated rhetoric of one of Kant’s ‘deductions’—or of those
constructed with such ingenuity by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel in his
footsteps – hides the absence of an interlocutor or the background
murmur of the skeptic who finds talk of postulating unseen but
necessary conditions for the possibility of experience every bit as
obtuse as the flat-footed assertions of vulgar realists and idealists who
claim they see ‘things’ or ‘sensations’. Underneath the interminable
deductions are dodgy start-points and perplexing methodologies
secured by uneasy comparison to cognitive domains that we ordinarily
think actually ‘work’ such as mathematics or geometry. These scientific
pretenders have put themselves in dignified dress and walk about in
public as ‘synthetic method’, or ‘intellectual intuition’, or ‘dialectic’—but
Heidegger tartly reminds us the apt riposte of the anti-systematic
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Friedrich Schlegel to the concept of a fundamental ‘dialectic of identity
and difference’: “A definition which is not funny is not worthwhile.”11
And if our professional philosophers are not often so loose as to find
each others’ starting-points and methodologies a matter of humor,
they do pointedly ignore each others’ detailed arguments and go for
the quick: to question whether the foundation or premises are clear
and persuasive, or as the geometers say are evident, whether the
argument in general is transparent or mere subterfuge, and hence
whether the claimed result or quod erat demonstrandum actually
follows. Whereas most academic philosophers were and are fairly
confident that they can either charm or stupefy in the lecture-hall,
those who conduct their business in private correspondence are both
more honest and direct. So just as the wise reader will find it
unprofitable to doze by the fire with the author of the Meditations on
First Philosophy and will go to the Objections and Replies for some
fresh air, the reader of the vast systems of the German idealists will
turn to comments of public critics to get a handle on her authors, or,
in our case, to the letters Fichte and Schelling exchanged in their
‘growth years’, where packed between tidbits of business and gossip-and some over-wrought accusations and histrionics--one can find
some earnest attempts to probe and uncover foundations and
(un)certainties.
Just as Socratic elenchus and Platonic dialectic had as their
social background the aggressive confrontations of that singular Greek
invention, the law-court, one might argue that the one-into-many, Iinto-not I, identity-into-difference, and I-into-We gymnastics of the
new dialectic practiced by Kant’s successors had as much to do with
the plurality of social voices and the social conflicts unleashed by
Enlightenment and Revolution as with the self-undermining
ratiocination that Kant diagnosed as the conduct of empty concepts
loosed from the controls of sensible intuition. Before the political ‘old
order’ dissolved in the tumultuous events in France that began with
the Declaration of the Rights of Man in 1789, the voices of
‘enlightened’ social critics such Hume and Adam Smith, Voltaire and
Diderot, and Lessing and Herder had attacked the power of ancient
institutions and entrenched beliefs and had begun to show that
complex systems of human reason and sensibility, social organization
and individual initiative, deployed over a spectrum of development
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that was both natural and historical, underpinned the emergence of
‘bourgeois man’. But the old order did not spontaneous combust or
disintegrate into the chaos of the Parisian mob or the frenzied bloodbath of ‘public safety’ officials, at least in German lands where some
sense of sanctity, order, and history combined with ‘enlightened policy’
and a penchant for learning kept the most progressive minds occupied
in the corridors of power—seminaries, courts, and universities. Battles
were fought, of course, but largely with the pen and not the sword.

The Quarrel between Philosophy and Poesie
“Unending free activity arises in us through free renunciation of the
absolute—the only possible absolute that can be given us and that we
only find through our inability to attain and know an absolute.”
Novalis, Fichte Studies #56612
One can frame the disagreements of Fichte and Schelling in the
context of four notable debates or ‘culture-war’ skirmishes that
irrupted in German lands late in the Eighteenth Century, and which
pitted literary giants, the so-called classicists and romantics, against
philosophers. The first two surround the ‘rehabilitation’ of Spinoza,
though perhaps the ‘re-‘ is a misnomer, since even in the free-thinking
low countries of the Seventeenth Century Spinoza could not teach in
any public way nor have visible disciples in the academy. The
conversations on Spinoza between the Enlightenment dramatist,
historian, critic, and advocate of religious tolerance Gotthold Ephraim
Lessing and the younger anti-Kantian polemicist and novelist Friedrich
Heinrich Jacobi that occurred in July of 1780 touched off a thirty-year
fire-storm of pamphlets, tracts, and denunciations that are generally
referred to as the ‘Pantheism Controversy’. Whether Lessing was
engaging in sly humor or being quite sincere in confessing to Jacobi
that he was a Spinozist—read ‘atheist’, ‘determinist’, ‘nihilist’ –Jacobi
was unambiguous in his response, which was to jump off the cliff of
rationalism in hope that a salto mortale into the ‘I know not what’ of
faith (Glaube) would save him from the murky hen kai pan of Lessing
and later the Jena romantics. The literary fracas between Jacobi and
Lessing’s posthumous defender, Moses Mendelssohn, guaranteed that
the very words ‘Spinoza’, ‘pantheism’, and ‘faith’ provoked immediate
reaction for decades to come, visible everywhere from Goethe’s Faust
to the Correspondence between Fichte and Schelling, and even to
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Hegel’s Faith and Knowledge.13 Lessing and Jacobi’s conversations
triggered a deep confrontation between skeptical and traditional voices
in the ‘enlightened’ world. The second contest was a repercussion of
the first: by the 1790’s suddenly Spinoza was fashionable, even touted
as the only logically consistent dogmatist, whether or not one wanted
to stand with him. Everyone wanted to find some sort of ‘synthesis’ of
Spinozistic pantheism or determinism with whatever seemed to still
work of the old humanism – the Poesie of the romantics, the
voluntarism of the transcendental idealists, and the belief in religious
inspiration among orthodox theologians. Whether these elements can
be mixed without provoking inconsistency, laughter or ‘dialectic’,
everyone wanted to try his hand at it. Kant’s posthumous notes from
quite late in his life suggest that even he dabbled with Spinozism. At
one point he comments that Spinozism, with its “seeing all things in
God,” is quite like transcendental idealism in wanting to adumbrate a
system of all possible objects of experience under one principle; at
another Kant calls Spinoza, Schelling, and Lichtenberg [a follower of
Fichte and a Naturphilosoph] the “past, present, and future of
transcendental philosophy.”14 Fichte’s letters to Schelling bristle with
accusations of him being ‘soft on Spinozism’. Fichte had been offended
at the young Schelling’s suggestion (in the 1775 Philosophical Letters
Dogmatism and Criticism) that one could view Spinozism and Critical
Philosophy as equally valid philosophies. For Fichte, one’s decision
between the two will be led by one’s interest: if one is interested in
things one will opt for Spinozism, if in becoming a free agent, for
Criticism.15 At one point in the Correspondence Schelling recalls an
apparently damning line from Fichte’s 1794 Foundations of the Entire
Wissenschaftslehre where the author suggests that the theoretical part
of the Wissenschaftslehre is “Spinozism made systematic,” except that
every I is itself the one substance.16
The latter two debates are more about means than ends, for
everyone in Germany more or less agreed that Kant was on target
with a morality of conscience or obligation rather than results, and that
the synoptic view of reality promoted by the natural sciences could and
should be reconciled with an updated humanism that integrated the
private conscience of the individual and the social power of
communities, economic association and small- and large-scale political
entities. Friedrich Schiller and Fichte took different routes to a
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naturalistic morality of conscience, the former suggesting an aestheticpsychological attunement of reason and sensibility as a tool for mass
moral education, the latter dramatically bringing the Categorical
Imperative from the philosophers’ Olympus down to the market-place
in a social philosophy that made the Other both the limit of my will and
the remote source of the objectivity of all my perceptions. Schiller’s On
the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters (1793-95)
tempered the rigor of Kant’s uncompromising demands centered on
universality, the dignity of the moral agent, and a projected social
order that secured both freedom and dignity with the anthropological
concerns about moral pedagogy and behavioral reinforcement; the
empty play of opposed faculties which Kant had nodded to in his
analysis of aesthetic creativity had a positive social function—
education into a lively and motivating sense of human equality, free
from the ambiguity of Kant’s term, ‘autonomy’. What was essentially
creative in Schiller’s reading of Kant was to use the Third Critique as a
tool for reading Kant’s moral philosophy. Fichte’s philosophy is more
centrally concerned with the moral order as envisioned by Kant
himself, where the appearance of an other will opposite mine both
limits my agency and provides the ‘push back’ that shows up in
cognition as the feeling of necessity (or ‘reality’) correlated with
perception and in a natural order of ‘things’ constructed from
perceptions. That the other is the ‘limit of my will’ is an idea that goes
back to Moses Maimonides17; that both ‘my’ will and that of putative
others arises only in an intersubjective framework is a strikingly
modern idea, especially since Fichte makes the willing that I am and
the constraint of the other the primitive entities of his transcendental
philosophy, much the way we commonly project biological, social, and
primitive moral constraints as the basis of our neo-Darwinian
anthropological explanations. The core of the social order and the legal
framework that cements it is the shared intuition that “I must limit my
freedom by the possibility of the freedom of the other.”18
A final disagreement concerns the different directions that the
romantic writers and literary critics of Jena and the post-Kantian
idealists took in fashioning an account of the realms of nature and
freedom, and of the tension between the role of the individual and the
influence of the social whole within the world critically regulated
conduct. Though both Fichte and Schelling shared certain enthusiasms
and especially political beliefs with the Jena romantics, there was a
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mutual distrust among them, based in part on the competition for
public forums for their views. A good deal of the Fichte-Schelling
Correspondence in 1800 and early in 1801 recounts intrigues around
the founding and editorship of a ‘common front’ journal that would
generally advance the cause of transcendental philosophy and
specifically review recent contributions in science, art, and letters that
harmonized (or failed to harmonize) with the Kantian spirit. Beyond
this competition for access to the educated public, the philosophers
and literary spirits of Jena took decidedly different approaches to
locating the source of human freedom, Fichte and Schelling in general
looking to the tensions and movements of the social whole, while the
poets, critics and theologians of the Romantic Circle started and ended
with the human individual.
G. F. P. Hardenberg (‘Novalis’), for example, had a complicated
relationship to Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre. His earnest study of the
1794 Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre propelled him, in
the name of freedom, to a radically free-form, anti-systematic form of
philosophizing. Breaking with Fichte pointedly in the matter of form,
Novalis advocated a micro-philosophy that encapsulated the whole of
phenomenal reality—which Fichte had tried to catalog and laboriously
‘deduce,--in the singular poetic insight. “An authentic philosophical
system must systematize freedom and unendingness, or, to express it
more strikingly, it must systematize systemlessness,” he writes in
1796-96.19 Working on a complex theory of signs where an individual
item or ‘trace’ can function now as a subject, now as an object, Novalis
attempts to capture the self-sundering, self-objectifying, and
ultimately self-recognizing creativity of the Fichtean I as a play in
which there is no privileged position: “Being, being-I, being free and
oscillating are all synonyms—one expression refers to the others—it is
simply the matter of a single fact.”20
At the time that concerns us, Schelling was most influenced by
Ludwig Tieck of all the Jena romantics, and it is probable that through
Tieck and Novalis he became acquainted with the theosophical dramas
of Jakob Böhme which would figure so prominently in his speculations
on God, freedom, and the nature of evil that occupied his thought from
1809-1815. Through Böhme, Tieck introduced the idea of religious
conversion, organic unity with nature, and the practice of highly
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idiosyncratic creativity or Poesie to the Jena circle.21 The retrieval of
‘old and curious things,’ medieval religion included, was a mark of
Tieck’s influence. Poesie was infinitely flexible in form, capable of
retrieval of the past and prophetic flights to a utopian future. Its
practitioners were not constrained, as were their philosophical fellowtravelers, to account for the world as it is, hence their unconventional,
if not anarchic practices, launched under the banner of the harmony of
truth, beauty and freedom. In romantic hands, fiction freed itself from
verisimilitude and became prized as a world-transforming power.
Friedrich Schlegel was probably the most philosophically erudite
author of the Romantic Circle. Between the years 1796 and 1801 he
attended Fichte’s lectures and undertook lengthy studies of Kant,
Herder, Fichte and Spinoza. His philosophy is as nonfoundationalist
and antisystematic as that of Hardenberg and its mode of expression
even more striking. He championed an ideal of art as ‘formed chaos’,
and prized wit, irony, and narratives incapable of definite
interpretation as the ways to open up an infinity of perspectives.
Schlegel’s idea of romantic ‘form’ was universal and all-embracing,
committed to mixing genres and overturning fixed convention. Like
Novalis, his reaction to Fichte’s endless and tightly wrought deductions
involved the deliberate antithesis, the embrace of the fragment, which
“like a small work of art, has to be entirely isolated from the
surrounding world and be complete in itself like a hedgehog.”22
Schlegel’s idea of philosophical system-- quite unlike Fichte’s 1794
three ground-principles or the flexible mixed method of the 1796/99
nova methodo lectures where intellectual intuition, hypothesis,
deduction, and bridging synthesis are all deployed to bring one as near
as possible to the whole truth23 --was blatantly circular, and open to
utilizing not only alternative proofs but alternative concepts.
Essentially agreeing with Novalis that “Everywhere we seek the
unconditioned [das Unbedingte], but find only things [Dinge],”
Schlegel finds in the romantic work of art a complete universe, an
exercise of creativity that, freed from the external reference of
classical canons or conventional realism, provides its own criterion and
which erases the boundary between the work of art and criticism.24
Most importantly for our concerns, Schlegel hoped to produce a
synthesis of Fichte’s philosophy of freedom with Spinoza’s naturalism,
a hope shared by Schelling at least in the years 1799-1801.25
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‘Atheism’ and the Turn toward Philosophical Religion
“True atheism, genuine unbelief and godlessness, consists in
pettifogging over the consequences of one’s actions, of refusing to
hearken to the voice of one’s own conscience . . . The living and
efficaciously acting moral order is itself God. We require no other God,
nor can we grasp any other.”
J. G. Fichte, On the Basis of a Belief in a Divine Governance of the
World (1798)26
If the above words had not forced Fichte to resign his
professorship in Jena and depart for Berlin in June of 1799, we would
not have the remarkable series of letters that passed between Fichte
and Schelling in the succeeding two years. In effect, Fichte had fired
himself from the tolerant University of Jena rather than receive a ‘slap
on the wrist’ reprimand from the Weimar Court over his publication of
a blatantly atheistic article by F. K. Forberg in his Philosophical Journal
entitled “On the Development of the Concept of Religion,” which he
prefaced with his own essay that was rather tame by Enlightenment
standards and not far removed from the spirit, if not the letter, of
Kant’s moral religion. Academic freedom was well-respected at Jena,
though the Weimar Court had technically acceded to the demands of
the Saxony Court, which in response to the complaints of an outraged
parent, had ordered all copies of the offending essays seized and
destroyed and threatened to withdraw all its students from Jena. With
characteristic overreaction, Fichte had announced beforehand that he
would resign if censured, and so he removed himself from the hotbed
of transcendental idealism that Jena had become in the 1790’s to a life
of relative obscurity in Berlin. Weimar issued its pro-forma rescript
with an acceptance of Fichte’s resignation appended.27
There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of Fichte’s claim in
1798 that we can grasp no God other a living and effective moral
order, but as his thinking unfolds in 1799 though 1802, much more
ontological weight accrues to this entity or force that comes to be
viewed as the ground of what humans experience as consciousness,
nature, and the intersubjective nest of right, obligation and moral
demand. In The Vocation of Man (1800) Fichte begins to speak of
‘faith’ (Glaube), the situation where the actual world is seen as ringed
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by and determined through the immediate consciousness of a preorientation of our freedom and power toward a rational end, the future
perfection of humanity. “We act not because we know, but we know
because we are called upon to act.”28 The finite I is fundamentally will
or deed, its own act, and causal chains of consequences extend from it
not only in the world of appearance but in an invisible or intelligible
order. One can only think of a harmonization of such agents in an
‘absolute will,’ whose function is to be the bond of the spiritual world
and enable will to act upon will. Whether this ‘absolute will’ is really
another will or just an abstract aspect of my will in double appearance
as the voice of conscience commanding me to respect the Other and
my pure obedience to the command, it is clear that Fichte’s absolute
will is a ‘moral God’ as figured in this popular work. The Infinite Will is
itself the moral order.29
The unity-and-community of willing that Fichte sketches in 1800
looks quite a bit like Leibniz’s kaleidoscope of monads refracting and
apparently interacting with one another upon the ground of a prime
monad or cosmic actor-presenter. Fichte struggles to give a properly
philosophical account of this ‘intelligible world’ over the next two
years. His letters to Schelling repeatedly turn to the promise that the
elaboration of the intelligible realm will clarify all obscurities in the
Wissenschaftslehre, or to talk of a ‘final synthesis’. Schelling confesses
he cannot follow this new ‘doctrine of religion’ and so can do no more
than suspend judgment on the Wissenschaftslehre in its current
incomplete form.30 But Fichte sporadically persisted in his attempts to
think through this ultimate ground in theoretical terms as the ground
of consciousness. In one letter to Schelling, he notes there is a huge
difference between embedding a system in a ‘fundamental reflex’
(Grundreflex) and trying to ground a system upon ‘reflection’.31 He
does not there explain what the difference is, but in the 1800 New
Version of the Wissenschaftslehre, he provide several hints: the
Grundreflex is what Kant called the ‘I think’ that necessarily
accompanies all definite acts of consciousness, or the omnipresent
activity that precedes all consciousness as its necessary condition. It is
also called the self-determining intuition prior to the I’s determined
consciousness that displays itself in finite states of consciousness and
actions, or the ‘pure reflex’ that is prior to the subject.32 The ‘Historical
Narrative’ of the early pages of this manuscript refers back to concepts
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like the ‘self-reversion’ of the 1794 Foundations and the ‘agility’ and
‘intellectual intuition’ of the nova method lectures given in 17961799.33
The New Version is a fragmentary manuscript, and to illuminate
it one must turn to an even stranger manuscript, the
Wissenschaftslehre of 1801-1802. Here Fichte’s late-found
philosophical theism reaches it apogee in the idea of an absolute
being, related to the absolute knowing that the Wissenschaftslehre
reconstructs by a ‘hiatus’ or chasm’; inside absolute knowing, being is
indeed related to knowing, but this relation is grounded in the absolute
or being itself, not in knowing.34 In one passage, the ‘Grundreflex’
seems to be given a clear and unambiguous meaning, but one that
associates it with ‘absolute being’ rather than the consciousnessassociated descriptors of ‘agility’ or ‘self-reversion’ or Kant’s ever-selfpresent ‘I think’:
Lastly, what was the ground of this idea of a closed system of
mutually determined intelligences, determined in the pure
thought of reason-intuition and the perception-thought derived
from it? It was absolute being itself, which conditions knowing—
and is hence an absolute mutual penetration of the two. The
deepest root of all knowing is, the unattainable union of pure
thought and the thought of the perception that we have
described. This [union] equals the moral law, the most sublime
case of all intuition, since it comprehends intelligence as its own
absolute real-ground. This union is absolutely not a matter of
this or that kind of knowing, but absolute knowing, simply as
such.35
Though he initially mocked Fichte’s theistic turn,36 Schelling
soon enough found it easy to turn from talk of an absolute identity
that is the ground of all quantitative difference among appearances
(an ‘indifference’ or neither-nor of all possible predicates and states)
back to the name ‘God,’ whose philosophical meaning Kant had
glossed as the compendium of all possible predicates.37 Prompted by
the naturalist and mathematician Carl Eschenmayer, who argued that
identity-philosophy provided not an steep ascent to the absolute, but a
highway to a base-camp from which any further journey must be
undertaken not by philosophy but by faith,38 Schelling begins to call
the ‘absolute’ God in his 1804 Philosophy and Religion, and to make
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moves to clarify his rather imprecise and ‘personal’ idea of intellectual
intuition: Intellectual intuition is: (a) neither a perception of inner
sense which finite understanding turns into a concept, nor (b) is it
compendium of all possible predicates, nor their universal disjunction,
nor the common element in all predicates, nor (c) is it a private,
psychological event.39 Schelling provides a more precise positive
discussion in the 1804 lectures on The System of Philosophy in
Genera. It involves a five-step argument that starts from three theses
put forward in the 1801 Presentation of My System -- (1) that knowing
involves identity of knower and known, (2) that reason transcends
subjectivity or personality, and (3) that reason’s sole rule is the law of
identity—and adds two new theses, (4) that God is the content of
reason’s self-recognizing self-affirmation, and (5) that this selfaffirmation involves insight into the impossibility of nihilism and so
answers Leibniz’s fundamental question: ‘Why is there something
rather than nothing?’40 Thus understood, intellectual intuition delivers
an impersonal and atemporal background of reason free of
subjectivity; it supplies only modal necessity, not the kind of
knowledge mediated by perception that can result is existential
propositions. Whether at this high altitude of discussion there is any
convergence between Fichte’s Grundreflex and Schelling’s intellectual
intuition-- or whether the one is inevitably still ‘idealistic’ and the other
‘realistic’--is something which cannot be decided here. It seems a
contest between a claimed omnipresent intuition ‘I think’ that
accompanies every concrete state of mind and an unavoidable horizon
of thinking that must always pronounce ‘There must be something
rather than nothing’. Put into propositions, each formula delivers a
distorted version of a fundamental experience, a completely global
horizon of consciousness, or an identically infinite horizon of being.

‘The Difference’ between Fichte and Schelling,
1800-1802
“One cannot proceed from a being . . . , but one has to proceed from a
seeing.”
Letter 19, Fichte in Berlin to Schelling in Jena, May 31 – August 7,
1801
The Correspondence which this volume presents as an
introduction to a handful of crucial works of both philosophers in the
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pertinent years is full of the chaos of life and as well as earnestness of
thought. We will bypass the matters of personalities and publishers,41
and head straight for the most problematic issue: though both parties
contend there is but one difference that separates them, each phrases
it in a different way or sidesteps the issue and instead discusses minor
difficulties that present themselves at the moment, perhaps in what
the other party said in the last letter.
By way of introduction to the letters, we can list three
candidates for ‘the difference’ which are relatively distinct as long as
we treat them abstractly. In any given patch of the discussion, they
may be intermingled or interwoven. It is natural in cataloging the
shortcomings of an adversary, or a friend who has brought
disappointment, to move from one offense to the other, and this is
typically the way the episodes of ‘pure’ philosophizing in the letters
unfold.

The Status of Being in Transcendental Idealism
Fichte took up the Kantian heritage in a doubly idealistic way,
adopting not only the general methodology of transcendental
explanation but taking the Kantian analysis of moral obligation as the
key clue for deciphering the nature of consciousness. Unlike most of
modern philosophy up to Reinhold, the primitive data for Fichtean
phenomenology are not ‘representation’ and the subject which has the
representation; instead, there is a single situation in which the selfactivity of an agent finds itself limited, strives to push back one and
every boundary, and comes to a satisfaction at once limited and
extensive in an intersubjective context of recognition and realization
shared by many finite subjects. Representation floats on a dynamic
surface of interactions which morph into the biological and
psychological phenomena of embodied consciousness—feelings,
strivings, drives—and only on top of that interactive basis can ‘objects’
and ‘perceptions’ be established. The 1794 Foundations of the Entire
Wissenschaftslehre, a provisional student handout that was liable to be
misread in several important ways, needed to be read backwards to
reveal this doubly idealist perspective: there are no things as such, no
presentations either, no stationary states of being, and no beings.
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Schelling’s early essays moved in the more conventional
framework of Kantian epistemology, with subjects and objects,
representations and entities, categories and intuitions treated in a
conventional or reified manner. Schelling’s chief argument for the
subjectivity of the absolute, as he imagined it early on, was the
impossibility of an infinite entity being an object or having thing-like
existence. Hence, though both Fichte’s and Schelling’s philosophical
ambitions were of similarly wide or systematic scope, from the very
first Fichte’s path was to fashion the Wissenschaftslehre from within,
from self-activity and self-intuition, while Schelling worked on a vast
fresco deployed over an external assemblage of objects, fundamentally
alien even though artistry could transform them into a temple of spirit.
This preference for thought over live intuition, for being or beingdetermined over self-determination endlessly irritated Fichte, though
Schelling on his part did not react well to numerous hints, direct,
indirect, and some even delivered by way of written comments to third
parties, that he ‘didn’t get it’.42
The heart of the face-off over the priority of intuition or being in
transcendental philosophy comes fairly late in the exchange, after
Fichte has read and commented on Schelling’s Presentation of My
System of Philosophy. Commenting on Schelling’s new standpoint,
Fichte maintains that the new system has being or an absolute realground as its principle, even if that principle is given the lofty name
‘reason’. Philosophy, he argues, must proceed from a seeing, not a
being. If it starts from anything other than a living intuition of selfactivity (‘intellectual intuition’), it is simply realism, a greater or lesser
sketch of Spinozism, and is quite unable to account for freedom or
spontaneous activity and the consciousness that derives from it.43
Schelling’s reply suggests there is no privileged access to an
underlying realm of activity or spontaneous self-reversion in
consciousness; Fichte simply starts from the surface phenomena of
apparent freedom and deduces his way to an ultimate real-ground, but
the procedure is arbitrary and invented, much like Kant’s concoction of
moral philosophy between the book-end postulates of freedom and
God. Schelling proceeds to undiplomatically poke fun at the Vocation
of Man for locating the real-ground wholly beyond the realm of
knowing, in faith. He suggests that as early as the 1795 Letters on
Dogmatism and Criticism he has, perhaps inarticulately and
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‘sentimentally’, pointed beyond idealism to a reconciling element,
being, which truly comprehends both itself and its other.44 The Letters
had been an early flashpoint between the two philosophers; in reply to
Schelling’s contention that one can arbitrary choose to be a realist or
idealist, and that both constructions may have useful purchase, Fichte
argued in the 1797 First Introduction that one’s character will dictate
the choice of one’s philosophy, and that only a person too slack to be
interested in freedom will opt for a world-picture that makes him a
thing among things. “The kind of philosophy one chooses thus depends
on the person one is. For a philosophical system is not a lifeless
household item one can put aside or pick up as one wishes; instead it
is animated by the very soul of the person who adopts it.”45

The Role of Nature in Freedom
As soon as Schelling began to develop a philosophy of nature
under the aegis of transcendental philosophy in 1797, Fichte became
uneasy. When he studied the 1800 System of Transcendental
Idealism, he was troubled both by the way that work granted
explanatory priority to nature rather than consciousness, and way
nature seemed to be viewed alongside consciousness as an
independent domain. Following Kant’s concept of matter as the
impenetrable occupation of space based on the interaction of one
activity with another, Schelling constructs a model of nature developed
from graduated levels of dynamic action and interaction. Fichte finds
this contrary to the method of transcendental idealism, where
intelligence arises not from brute interactions of unintelligent forces,
but, as in moral agency, from self-limitation.46 He writes to Schelling
that transcendental philosophy cannot grant an independent status to
nature—or to consciousness either. It must instead fictionally construct
both from the same real-ideal activity of the I. Nature can appear to
Wissenschaftslehre only as something found, finished, perfected—
operating according to the laws of intelligence because it has been
abstracted from intelligence and nurtured as a fictional construct.47
One could infer that whatever activity and development are found in
nature come from the artistry inherent in science.
Schelling response gives notice to Fichte that his anxieties are
not misplaced. Rather than acknowledge that Wissenschaftslehre and
The Philosophical Rupture between Fichte and Schelling: Texts and Correspondence, 1800-1802, (2012): pg. 1-20.
Publisher Link. This article is © SUNY Press and permission has been granted for this version to appear in ePublications@Marquette. SUNY Press does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted
elsewhere without the express permission from SUNY Press.

19

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

philosophy are coextensive, Schelling regards the former as a
propaedeutic to the latter. Philosophy arises only when the philosopher
abstracts from the subjectivity that posited the subject-object in an
ideal or psychological mode and proceeded to examine the human
faculties of mind; the abstraction evidently threshes the activity found
in Wissenschaftslehre from its personal hull and enables the
philosopher to work with the ‘pure’ subject-object, the principle of
theoretical or natural philosophy. Only as a result of observing and
describing the self-construction of reality in nature-philosophy can the
philosopher, in a separate-but-equal transcendental science, launch
into the construction of consciousness on the basis of organic and
animate nature. Schelling points in his Introduction to the genetically
organized System of Transcendental Idealism proper as the place
where he signaled the equiprimordial status of transcendental and
natural philosophies and cut himself loose from the “mere logic” of
Fichte’s construction.48 The essential structure of identity-philosophy,
which Schelling will unveil in the spring of the next year, is in place:
philosophy is a tripartite but organic whole, introduced by a logic or
abstract metaphysics of identity, and fleshed out by two
complementary real-philosophies, those of nature and of
consciousness.
Fichte first reply is a letter he left unsent.49 His displeasure is
quite evident. The best that philosophy of nature can do to explain
nature is to analogically import the vitality of consciousness into
nature; that may produce a heuristic account for the actor-observer,
but it nowhere touches anything outside of finite consciousness.
Though in this sense, nature can be explained from consciousness, the
reverse will never obtain. Consciousness is sui generis, and any
attempt to back away from this lands one in the muddled Spinozism of
Schlegel and Schleiermacher, or the even more muddled realism of
Reinhold and Bardili.50 Fichte penned and sent a quieter response
which simply noted that Schelling’s philosophy of nature does not
follow from the principles of transcendental idealism, as previously
understood, but would require an expansion of those principles. The
“transcendental philosophy of the intelligible” which he soon hoped to
write, would provide such an expansion.51 The unsent draft supplies
more detail on how this might happen: previous versions of the
Wissenschaftslehre brought to light the nature of finite consciousness,
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the awareness of an apparently external reality sandwiched between
activity that manifests as feeling and the command of conscience. A
theory of the intelligible world would expand the account to the
noumenal order, and Fichte seems to give hope to the idea that nature
could be given a philosophical account on the basis of this noumenal
activity, which he also calls ‘God’.52
In the 1800 New Version of the Wissenschaftslehre there is
mention of the author’s intent to oppose Schelling’s separate
philosophy of nature, but aside from the general line of argumentation,
that object-consciousness--hence object-oriented presentation or
activity-- necessarily presupposes an immediate self-consciousness
which is prereflexive and cannot itself be an object of consciousness,
no clear line of argument against Schelling’s view of nature is
formulated.53 In the Preface to his 1801 Presentation of My System,
Schelling made clear that he had always presented philosophy of
nature alongside transcendental philosophy, not as subordinate to it or
derived from anything less than the ‘absolute identity’ or ‘indifference’
of the natural and the transcendental that the new system asserts.
Though in letters to Fichte he contends that conscious intelligence is
just a higher potency of activity in nature, and hence in some sense
emergent from natural organization,54 My System concludes its
Spinozistic deduction of absolute identity and the framework of nature
with the promise to first purify activity in organic nature until the
account arrives at the absolute indifference-point, and from there
construct a separate wholly positive account of the three levels that
displayed themselves negatively in inorganic and animate nature. It is
not quite clear whether at this point in his philosophical development,
Schelling thinks that consciousness exists alongside nature or as part
of nature or as emergent within nature.55 It is clear, however, that
none of these versions of ‘naturalism’ are acceptable to Fichte.
Though Fichte’s reading notes of Schelling’s new system do not
often refer to nature, the 1801-1802 Wissenschaftslehre demonstrates
a positive attempt on Fichte’s part to refute what he takes to be the
strongest form of Schelling’s naturalism—the emergent or
developmental view that consciousness rests on, presumes, and in
some sense is dependent upon its organic basis in nature. One can
perhaps think of consciousness as originating in some primordial
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freedom, he argues, but one cannot perceive that it has originated in
that way; there is no necessity accompanying the thought, and so no
objectivity lending weight to the hypothesis.56 Nature need be
conceived as no more than an interworking of mechanical drives, a
play of nonlocal forces universally permeating the whole of being and
thus coercing it uniformly in every point; conscious agency, however,
presupposes individual points of agency and efficacy, hence the
capacity for novelty and starting-anew that we call ‘freedom’. Nature is
uniform and homeostatic, while the social order is differentiated and
sometimes erratic, hence a field of singular actions performed by
plural agents. Nature is the domain of the all-alike, while the ethical
order is a harmonization of unique individuals.57 Fichte at one point
offers a definite contrast between the Wissenschaftslehre and what he
calls the ‘new Spinozism’: “Knowing is supposed to come about as a
necessary consequence of nature, a higher power of nature—taking
the term in a sense that extends all the way to empirical being. But
this contradicts the inner nature of knowing, which is to be absolute
origination, a coming into being from the essence of freedom, not of
being.”58

Philosophical Methodology: Transcendental or Absolute
Idealism?
While Fichte and Schelling seem almost viscerally focused on
rejecting each other’s approach to explaining nature and freedom (as
universal and singular modes of activity), a subtler difference between
the two concerns the question of philosophical methodology, or in their
jargon, ‘intellectual intuition’ and ‘philosophical construction’. Each
tries to convince the other that his efforts have a credible and solid
Kantian basis—Schelling refers to the Third Critique’s discussion of
reason’s demand for unconditioned necessary, Fichte to the First
Critique’s picture of knowing as a synthesis of concepts and intuitions.
Fichte clarifies his more recent thoughts about methodology in the
Announcement for the New Version of the Wissenschaftslehre as an
active but systematic knowing, a mathesis proceeding in something
like geometrical ‘evidence’, whose every element is an intuition.59
Indeed Fichte had previously rejected the idea that a ‘thought’ is
anything other than an arrested intuition, a single frame snipped from
the cinematic flow of the I’s essentially self-reverting activity or
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agility.60 Schelling seems to have a slightly more conceptual approach,
even when he uses the same term, ‘intellectual intuition’, for his
version of reason-intuition is a convergence of ultimate opposites—
knower and known, subject and object, universality and particularity—
which merge in an ultimately self-actualizing idea, something like the
old metaphysical idea of the ontological proof of God’s existence, but
this time done from God’s stance, not from the outside, and resulting
in something more dynamic and illuminating than ‘certainty’ about an
outside entity’s existence.61 Though he does not use Fichte’s language
of freedom and act to speak of reason and its work, what Schelling
does say of it presumes a contemplative activity in the reader that
ultimately sparks into the experience of the convergence of knower
and known. The first nine theorems of the 1801 Presentation of My
System are extraordinarily difficult in that they wall the reader round
with ultimate abstractions—‘reason’, ‘identity’, ‘the absolute’—which
demand sacrifice of reflection, subjectivity, and personal point of view
if they are to be conceived at all. It is perhaps with some justification
that Fichte complains of this systematic starting- point that it lacks all
evidence unless one assumes things smuggled in from the
Wissenschaftslehre.62 One can imagine his agitated state of mind when
he writes of the whole attempt: “Polyphemus without an eye.”63
From his side, Schelling seems to have no detailed knowledge of
the starting-point and methodology of Fichte’s second Jena system,
delivered in the nova methodo lectures of 1796/99 and put before the
public in but a few scant pages published in 179764; he seems to take
the 1794 Foundations as the definitive, not the initial, form of Fichte’s
system. Fichte’s ‘intellectual intuition’ involves grasping that the I
which is self-conscious when it is conscious of something is
immediately and indubitably conscious of itself. This is Kant’s ‘I think’
that accompanies all representations, and it is the transcendental
ground of all representations, all object-consciousness. It is
transcendental, not empirical; were it empirical, one would have an
endless regress of new states that grasped the last state of
consciousness, but never self-consciousness. When one responds to
the command, “think yourself,” one has self-consciousness, and the
reason that is so is because, firstly, one does the I, and secondly, one
interrupts the previous flow of states of consciousness with the novelty
of the response to the command. Fichte’s argument is not about
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Cartesian certainty or claimed self-access; it is about activity,
spontaneity, and agility intuited in immediate self-consciousness.
Descartes’ meditative claims were first-order and his ‘I think’ is
empirical; Fichte’s intellectual intuition, as he tries to clarify in a very
difficult letter to Schelling, is second-order, and though immediate, it
is more fundamental, one might say ever-present, than any empirical
state of mind or object-cognition.65 On this basis, Fichte can say that
Schelling is correct in talking about the identity of knowing and being
on a relative, that is, first-order or empirical, level. But such a correct
grasp of relative truth is just half-truth and will not provide the
systematic foundation for transcendental idealism that they both seek.
It is curious that Fichte writes to Schelling on these
methodological matters with such assurance, or that the writings of
1797 lay out such an impeccably simple path to intellectual intuition
and the I that performs it. When one turns to the fragmentary
sketches of the 1800 New Version of the Wissenschaftslehre, one sees
a writer tormented by doubts about whether he can communicate
what he thinks, or even whether he can steadily and clearly think what
he intermittently thinks. Schelling never lacks self-assurance, but the
round-about way he expounds intellectual intuition and its object—I.e.,
the indifference absolute that is the neither-nor of all possible
predicates--leaves him open to Fichte’s charge that his method is
wholly conceptual, nothing other than reflection or discursive intellect
seeking to heal the rift in reflection itself and so unable to get beyond
a purely conceptual formula: the neither/nor of knowing and being, or
subject and object, etc.
Schelling’s best explanation of intellectual intuition in 1801-1802
is buried in a footnote summary that links the two segments of his
essays on methodology that were separated in different issues of his
journal. There he says,
Since reason is challenged to conceive the absolute neither as
thought nor as being, but still to think it, a contradiction arises
for reflection since it conceives the absolute as either a case of
thinking or one of being. But intellectual intuition enters even
into this contradiction and produces the absolute. In this
breakthrough lies the luminous point where the absolute is
positively intuited.66
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The passage goes on to explain that while the function of intuition is
thus negative within reflection, within philosophical construction it is
positive and actually exhibits the absolute as a process of interweaving
opposites (Ineinsbildung)-- an analogy with the work of the
imagination guided by aesthetic genius which produces totality in finite
form and reconciles opposites in one concrete shape.67 This sounds
more prosaic than Fichte’s unearthing of the primordial selfconsciousness underneath all acts of consciousness, but note that
there is a tacit appeal to subjectivity or personal experience in the
word “breakthrough” and a tacit invocation of ‘genius’ that the word
Ineinsbildung brings with it. But should the philosopher take her stand
with the mystic and the artistic creator as part of the ruling elite, or is
the call to selfhood and freedom implicit in living in a republic of laws
and a community of those bound by morality a more universal and
shareable experience? In either case, it seems there must be some
empirical analog to anchor transcendental philosophy.
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